By Gabriel Lipow

The word קנאי (“kana’i”) in Hebrew translates to English as “zealot.” However, historically, the word also has another connotation. It refers to the kind of person who, much like their namesakes of old, is going to get us all killed in their religious fervor. Today, such a group exists in Israel, and it is equally as dangerous as the zealots of old were to our future. Even as the war against the Hamas draws to a close, the national religious movement in Israel – known better in the West as “the settler movement” – poses a clear and imminent threat not just to the future of Israel, but to hundreds of thousands of lives in the West Bank, Jewish and Arab alike. It is difficult both legally and politically to utilize the same tools the state uses on the Arab population of the Palestinian Authority on Israeli citizens, a prime example being administrative detention (frequently used to detain suspected terror operatives). A problem requires thinking not about consequences for settlers who harass and attack Arab villages, but about deterrents to prevent them from conducting raids on Area C Arab villages. For this reason, I propose that the Israeli General Security Service (commonly referred to as the Shin-Bet or Shabak) assist Palestinian villages in the West Bank in creating local militia garrisons for the purposes of both law enforcement and defense.

The current iteration of the national religious movement in Israel – not the Hamas or Hezbollah – constitutes the greatest threat to both the future of Israel and the dream of a Palestinian state. They have proven themselves both willing and capable of murdering [12] for their cause of controlling the entirety of the West Bank and are both able to and interested in sabotaging decades of progress made towards normalization and peace with the Arab world. [18]

Worse, the settlers can easily launch an attack so heinous that a reprisal-in-force from the local Palestinians will be inevitable and uncontrollable. With Arab and Israeli towns so heavily intermixed, a massacre of a village of 100 can easily spark a reprisal attack resulting in ten thousand Israeli dead. As an analogue, consider the 7 October attack. The surprise breach of the fortified border (which was constantly surveilled and had the entirety of the 162^nd/Gaza division stationed nearby) [3] resulted in more than a thousand dead. Needless to say, there is no such cleanly defined border and no one area to surveil in the West Bank.

The resulting war will cost thousands more lives of both Israelis and Palestinians. To make matters worse, it would then result in the West Bank fully controlled and occupied by Israel – a predicament both the Israeli public and the local Palestinian population would much rather avoid. [19] Since these settlers are Israeli themselves, the government’s options are limited for how to deal with them. The fact that the settlers’ party is key to the current ruling coalition only compounds the problem. Both Israel and the Americans have made attempts to control the problem, with the U.S. sanctioning individual settlers [4], and Israel until late 2024 using its ability to simply detain particularly dangerous settlers. [5] 

However, sanctions have limits, administratively detaining Israeli citizens is a gray area legally (as it is not defined in Israeli law as something which is permissible to do to citizens) and nigh-impossible politically. Even the army – nominally on the same side as the settlers – has been the target of their fanaticism. [11] But that does not mean that the problem is being entirely ignored. The United States Security Cooperation Agency (USSC), responsible for coordinating combined security efforts of Israel and the Palestinian Authority (henceforth referred to as the PA), recognizes that the settler movement is a critical problem. Their approach to the problem has thus far been to help the PA organize units that would be able to quickly and effectively respond to both internal and external attacks. [1] In fact, the culmination of these efforts was put to the test against the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad stronghold in Jenin in late 2023 [13]. To quote Viktor Chernomydin (Russia’s Prime Minister under President Yeltsin), they “tried their hardest, but it went the way it usually does.” That is to say – poorly. [14]

One barrier in creating an effective Palestinian response force stems from the way the PA is organized. Something critical to understand about the PA is that it, and the party which dominates it (the Fatah), are a vast network of factions, each with different beliefs and each with their own sub-factions, as opposed to a single unified bloc. [15] As a result, membership in a fighting force is determined by a soldier’s loyalty instead of their merit. Worse, the fighters are often loyal not to the PA, but to a faction within the PA. [6] The inevitable result of this sort of factionalism is that even if the hypothetical response team was able or interested in responding to an attack (neither of which is guaranteed), they will almost certainly be less organized and effective than they ought to be fighting against settlers – and that can easily spell disaster.

Briefly mentioned earlier were clashes between the IDF and the settlers. Given the army’s willingness to confront settlers and its position of overwhelming power, another possible solution could see the army have units patrol Palestinian towns and villages themselves or be on standby to respond to incidents themselves. Although this would certainly reduce the amount of potential confrontations (especially if the settlers understand they would be fired upon if they attack), there are problems, both political and logistical, that are insurmountable enough to rule out the idea. First, there is the internal political issue. The optics of Israeli soldiers opening fire on fellow Israelis carrying out an attack against Palestinians, are so catastrophically bad that any attempt to stop an attack would be the last such attempt. Equally as important, such a mission requires an order from the civilian government. Given that the party of the settlers (in other words, the same people that this is supposed to suppress) sits in government (and is key to maintaining the coalition), this is a total non-starter politically. Second, there is the army issue. Unilaterally sending the army to patrol and garrison large regions of the West Bank would be equally unpopular with the Palestinian people as it would be with the army and public of Israel, who would not want to commit the enormous resources and manpower necessary to accomplish this mission. It should also be noted that this option is tantamount to a military occupation, which all parties in equal measure, (as mentioned previously) would prefer to avoid. And of course, the army is not consistently effective in stopping the attacks even then. The increased prevalence of hagmar units – effectively militia composed of local reservists (themselves often settlers or sympathizers) nominally organized by the army but effectively independent on the ground – in settler attacks makes this an altogether impossible course of action. [7]

That feeds into the third big problem – the impact on Palestinians. Although such a move could prevent settler attacks, it also seriously damages the prospects of a Palestinian state. Besides being a de facto military occupation, this would also greatly damage the legitimacy of the PA (which remains the closest the Palestinians have to a national government), whose various factions would have no choice but to either effectively surrender or to break away from the PA and form their own paramilitaries to resist the move. Whatever the result, the future of a Palestinian state, already much bleaker than in 2022, is eroded further.

There is a suggestion that may occur to some who follow the politics of the Gaza ceasefire and subsequent treaty. Could volunteer units from foreign nations be utilized as a peacekeeping force? Possibly. The obvious follow-up question would be, “Who?” Who would supply the units? The U.N? Aside from their historical unlikelihood to actually keep peace, [21] the odds of convincing the Israeli public and government to allow such a thing would be incalculably small at best, as members of UN agencies have been previously linked to the Hamas. [8] The United States? Possibly – but the desires of the Americans are tied to the desires of the president, whose views change depending on who he talked to last. Any peacekeepers sent could be just as quickly withdrawn if the president has a bad day. Or if someone hurt his feelings. The Arab states? Although the concept of an ISF (International Stabilization Force) was mentioned in the ceasefire deal and is a potential template for the West Bank, it itself has one key problem. It doesn’t actually exist yet.

All of these suggestions carry another serious flaw. They actively suppress any ability of the Palestinians to self-determine and leave them totally dependent on the goodwill of others – whether the PA (an unelected and inept obstacle to genuine statehood), Israel, or other nations – for their security. This further hampers the ability of Palestinians to determine their own future, one free of both Israel and the PA. But suppose there was a way to deter settler attacks while simultaneously advancing Palestinian independence?

A surprisingly novel option involves giving the Arab villages being targeted the ability to face attacks independently. It is well understood that the threat of injury or death is equally as effective at preventing future hostilities as killing attackers. But while most nations have militaries that are designed to deter attackers, the Palestinian Arabs do not. The PA, as discussed, is incapable. The Hamas has other problems, in part due to having been shown to not be a capable fighting force.

As with many other elements of Palestinian history however, a parallel can be drawn with the history of Jews and later Israelis. During the Mandatory period, attacks against Jews in Palestine – in particular the 1929 Hebron massacre – compelled the Yishuv (the governing body of Jewish Palestinians) to form a militia called HaHaganah, or “the defense.” This militia initially was town/village level, and originally was designed to repel and deter attacks against Jews even as the British garrison stood by and did not intervene. [10] In doing so, it formally began what can be considered Israeli military history. Following the creation of the state, it was reformed into the Tzava HaHaganah L’Yisrael – “Army for the Defense of Israel,” better known as the IDF. [17]

In a cruel bit of irony, it is now Arab villages being attacked, with the IDF and PA responding ineptly to these attacks at best. As it was historically for Jews, Palestinian Arabs stand much to gain from organizing village-level militia of their own. Unlike the IDF and the PA, such a militia could respond to an attack on a village by mobilizing their own militia to fight it, although the mere presence of such a militia is likely more than enough to deter any attack.

Now, such an idea will sound absolutely insane and abhorrent to the average Israeli (and frankly to any sane person). And not without reason – simply allowing militia to be formed and providing weapons is a recipe for disaster. But having the Jewish division of the Shabak (Israel’s counter-terror spy agency with a section dedicated to Jewish extremism) organize, train, and regulate these militia can minimize that risk to a number smaller than the risk currently posed by the settler attacks to Israel’s security and give the program political legitimacy within Israel. Although it still sounds insane as an idea, it is also true that we live in insane times. Something similar has been claimed to have been done in the Gaza Strip already. [16] And as for the idea that the militia will be usurped to launch an attack against Israel… It is redundant. Those who choose to attack Israelis don’t need a militia to do so – they simply join the Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, or any other terror group operating in the West Bank.

Aside from the short-term benefits of deterring settler attacks (and thus preserving lives and livelihoods), this initiative has the potential to achieve much longer-term strategic objectives, both Israeli and Palestinian. For the Palestinians, it can be the impetus for the creation of a Palestinian national military. Simultaneously, it can increase the power of individual villages relative to the PA and make any future Palestinian state less dependent on the PA – and thus more possible. For Israel, it serves as a means by which the army can be recalled and redeployed to deal with more pressing and relevant issues, as well as reducing the likelihood that a massacre of an Arab town – itself enough to kickstart another war – will happen.

It is often said that although history is not cyclical, it rhymes. Just as Jews were once powerless in the face of raids against their villages in Mandatory Palestine, so too are modern Palestinians helpless against West Bank Israeli settlers. But history can also be learned from, and its rhymes can be learned from and used for the benefit of all. Local Palestinian militias, created voluntarily by villages and backed by the Shabak, have the potential to not only defuse a critically dangerous situation in the West Bank but also to contribute to the long-term development of Palestinian statehood.

References

[1] About Us – United States Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority – United States Department of State. (2020, December). United States Department of State.
https://2017-2021.state.gov/about-us-united-states-security-coordinator-for-israel-and-the-palestinian-authority/

[2] Borger, J. (2024, August 23). Israeli security chief condemns “terrorism” of militant settlers. The Guardian.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/23/israeli-security-chief-ronen-bar-hilltop-youth-west-bank

[3] “Controversial commander Barak Hiram named next Gaza Division chief.” (2026). Timesofisrael.com.
https://www.timesofisrael.com/controversial-commander-barak-hiram-named-next-gaza-division-chief/

[4] Department of State, U. S. (2024, February 5). Imposing Certain Sanctions on Persons Undermining Peace, Security, and Stability in the West Bank. Federal Register.
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/02/05/2024-02354/imposing-certain-sanctions-on-persons-undermining-peace-security-and-stability-in-the-west-bank

[5] Fabian, E., & Sokol, S. (Eds.). (2024, November 22). Defense minister declares end to administrative detention against West Bank settlers. Times of Israel.
https://www.timesofisrael.com/defense-minister-declares-end-to-administrative-detention-against-west-bank-settlers/

[6] Garofalo, D. (2024, January 30). Which are the Palestinian factions and their military wings?
https://www.danielegarofalomonitoring.com/p/which-are-the-palestinian-factions

[7] Graham-Harrison, E., & Kierszenbaum, Q. (2026, January 30). Settler-only IDF units functioning as “vigilante militias” in West Bank. The Guardian.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/30/settler-only-idf-units-functioning-as-vigilante-militias-in-west-bank

[8] INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY: USAID OIG’s Investigative Work to Prevent UNRWA Staff Associated With Hamas From Circulating to Other U.S. Government-Funded Aid Organizations. (2025, April 14). Usaid.gov.
https://oig.usaid.gov/node/7597

[9] Kaufman, E. (2025, July 5). A New Palestinian Offer for Peace With Israel. Wall Street Journal.
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/new-palestinian-offer-peace-israel-hebron-sheikh-emirate-36dd39c3

[10] Knight, J. (2011). Securing Zion? Policing in British Palestine, 1917–39. European Review of History, 18(4), 523–543.
doi:10.1080/13507486.2011.590283

[11] Lidman, M. (2025, June 30). Israeli settlers attack Palestinians and IDF military vehicles in West Bank. PBS News.
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/israeli-settlers-attack-palestinians-and-idf-military-vehicles-in-west-bank

[12] Lidman, M. (2026, February 19). Palestinian-American man killed in West Bank clashes with settlers. AP News.
https://apnews.com/article/israel-west-bank-gaza-war-palestinians-ec2736c95acf273a9fb1f2d541f46bb5

[13] Mohammed, M., & Goldenberg, T. (2024, December 25). Why Palestinian Authority forces are cracking down on Palestinian militants in the occupied West Bank. PBS News.
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/why-palestinian-forces-are-cracking-down-on-palestinian-militants-in-the-occupied-west-bank

[14] Mustafa, T. (2025, March 4). Israel’s West Bank Incursions Highlight the Dilemmas of Palestinian Politics. Crisis Group.
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/israelpalestine/israels-west-bank-incursions

[15] Parker, C., & Zemni, S. (1998). From Securitization Toward Consociation? Arab Studies Journal, 6/7(2/1), 34–56.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27933737

[16] Reuters Staff. (2026, January 7). Israel-backed militia kill two Hamas operatives in Gaza, militia says. Reuters.
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-backed-militia-kill-two-hamas-operatives-gaza-militia-says-2026-01-07/

[17] Schiff, Z. (2024). A History of the Israeli Army: 1874 to the Present. Plunkett Lake Press.

[18] Shelezinger, Y. (2025, October 26). Benjamin Netanyahu explodes over Smotrich’s camel remark. The Jerusalem Post.
https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-871667

[19] Survey: Israelis favor Arab ties over West Bank annexation. (2025, September 14). The Jerusalem Post.
https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-867446

[20] The Long Peace. (2012, October 11). The Breakthrough Institute.
https://thebreakthrough.org/articles/the-long-peace

[21] Ukashi, R. (2008). UN-reliable: Explaining the failure of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.[22] Валагин, А. (2011, November 2). Бессмертные фразы Виктора Черномырдина. Русская Газета.
https://rg.ru/2013/11/02/frazi-site.html

Image credit to Wikimedia Commons and Bernard Gotfyrd via Public Domain.